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INTRODUCTION 
There is a familiar conception of Leibniz's views about the nature of 
necessity and contingency which portrays him as a sort of grandfather of 
possible worlds semantics for modaI logic. According to this conception, 
Leibniz envisages an infinity of possible worlds, of which God (who exists 
necessarily) chooses and actualizes one (the best). Necessary truths are 
propositions that are true in all possible worlds. Contingent truths are propo- 
sitions that are true in the actual world but false in at least one other possible 
world. What worlds are possible, what would happen in them, and how they 
are related to one another as similar or dissimilar, better or worse, do not 
change from one world to another; and therefore all truths about what is 
possible are necessary. (This Leibniz is, to be precise, a grandfather of possible 
worlds semantics for S5, the strongest of the usual systems of modal logic.) 
For this reason also the property of being the best possible world belongs 
necessarily to the world that has it. The root of all contingency is that it is not 
necessary but only contingent that God chooses to actualize the best. All and 
only those truths are contingent whose truth depends on God's free choice 
of the best. 
We meet this Leibniz in Chapter 111 of Bertrand Russell's Critical Exposi- 
tion of the Philosophy ofLeibniz. An important part of Russell's interpretation 
is the famous exception he makes in Leibniz's principle that in every true 
proposition the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the 
subject. "The assertion of existence, alone among predicates, is synthetic," 
Russell says, "and therefore, in Leibniz's view, contingent."' All other predi- 
cates are contained in the concepts of subjects that have them; but existence 
is not, except in the case of God. Therefore truths about what any possible 
individual or possible world is like, or  would be like if it existed or were 
actual, are all necessary; but it is contingent which possible world is actual, 
and therefore which possible individuals exist. 
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Russell gave up these views after reading Couturat. But according to E. M. 
Curley, "Recent discussions . . . have tended in some measure to go back to 
Russell's original view (before Couturat) that, apart from the proposition 
that God exists, existential truths are not analytic."Z I think that the tendency 
described by Curley does indeed exist, and is quite broadly favorable to the 
picture of Leibniz held by Russell before Couturat. But it seems to me to be 
leading us backward, not only in time, but also in our understanding of 
Leibniz. For the familiar Leibniz described above is in large part a creature of 
misunderstanding, though not exactly of fiction. 
A variety of conceptions of the problem of contingency, and solutions to 
it, can be found in Leibniz's writings. There was development in his thought 
on it, and he held more than one solution at once. There are two main solu- 
tions, to be set out in sections 1.0-1.5 and 2.0-2.6, respectively, of the present 
paper. An accurate account of Leibniz's theories of contingency will therefore 
be rather complex. We will come toward the end of it, rather than at the 
beginning, to the question whether he regarded existence as a predicate 
contained in the concepts of things that exist. 
1.0 Leibniz's First Main Solution 
Leibniz tells us that even before he thought of the problem of contingency 
in terms of his analytic theory of truth, he had "found [himselfl very close to 
the opinion of those who hold everything to be absolutely necessary," but 
"was pulled back from this precipice by considering those possible things 
which neither are nor will be nor have been" (FC 178/L 263).3 Just how close 
he was to the cliff, we shall see in section 1.1; and in sections 1.2-1.5 we shall 
consider the way in which he says he was rescued from it. 
1.1 The Letter to Wedderkopf 
In May 1671 Leibniz wrote a letter to Magnus Wedderkopf, a legal scholar 
in Kiel, about "the necessity of events" (A II,i,I 17f./L 146f.).4 He begins by 
arguing that everything that happens is determined by God's decree, and 
admitting that this is a "hard" conclusion. He then begins to trace the cause of 
Pilate's damnation, from his lack of faith to  his failure to pay attention, to his 
failure to understand the utility of paying attention, to a lack of causes of 
such understanding. 
For it is necessary to  analyze everything into some reason, and not to stop until we arrtve 
at  a first reason-or else it must be admitted that something can exist w~thout  a sufficient 
reason for its existence, and this admission destroys the demonstration of the existence of 
God and of many PhiIosophicai theorems. What then is the ultimate reason of the divine 
will? The div~ne intellect. For God wills those things that H e  understands to be best and 
most harmonious, and selects them, as it were, from an infinite number of all possibles. 
Leibniz goes on to state that the ultimate reason of things is found in the 
essences, possibilities, or ideas of things, which "coincide with God Himself," 
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are understood by Him, and have no reason outside themselves. Leibniz 
draws a strongly necessitarian conclusion: 
Since God is the most perfect mind, however, it is impossible for Him not to beaffected by 
the most perfect harmony, and thus to be necessitated to the best by the very ideality of 
th~ngs.  . . Hence ~t follows that whatever has happened, is happen~ng, o r  will happen is 
best and therefore necessary, but . . . with a necessity that takes nothing away from 
freedom because ~t takes nothing from the will and the use of reason. 
Three points deserve comment here. 
( I )  Leibniz has already slipped over the edge of the precipice in this letter. 
He states flatly and without qualification that everything that ever happens is 
necessary. This is his simplest solution of the problem of contingency. If there 
is no contingency, there is no need to account for it or explain its nature. 
But Leibniz did not remain content with this position. On his own copy of 
the letter to Wedderkopf he later wrote, "I have since corrected this; for it is 
one thing for sins to be infallibly going to happen, and anotherthing for them 
to be going to happen necessarily." He continued to ascribe necessity to all 
things, but only with some qualification. "What is actual is in some way 
necessary" (Gr 536; emphasis mine). Even in free actions there is allowed to 
be "hypothetical" and "moral" necessity, but not "absolute" or "metaphysical" 
necessity (G VI,37/Preface to the Theodicy). 
(2) Leibniz was a compatibilist, maintaining to the end of his life (to 
Clarke, V,3) that every event is determined but some acts are nonetheless free. 
According to the formula of his maturity, freedom consists in intelligence 
(understanding the object of deliberation), spontaneity (insofar as the source 
of the action is within the agent), and contingency (which excludes absolute, 
logical, or metaphysical necessity, but not hypothetical or moral necessity) 
(T 288-290, 302). In  the letter to Wedderkopf, however, we meet a more 
extreme compatibilism, which does not make contingency a necessary 
condition of freedom. In this early work voluntariness and intelligence seem 
to suffice for freedom: necessity "takes nothing away from freedom because 
it takes nothing from the will and the use of reason." The later addition of 
contingency as a condition of freedom is surely related to the change in 
Leibniz's willingness to admit without qualification the necessity of all events, 
but the latter development in his thought comes sooner than the former. In a 
work of 1673, in which he argues vigorously against the claim that sins are 
(unqualifiedly) necessary (Conf 54ff.), he still says, "To preserve the privilege 
of free will, it is enough that we have been so placed at a fork in the road of life, 
that we do only what we will, and will only what we believe to be good" 
(Conf 82). Later, however, Leibniz distinguished a sense in which freedom is 
opposed to necessity and a sense in which it is opposed only to compulsion 
(B 121); and in several texts from the years 1681-1685 (Gr 299,308,229; cf. G 
VII, 108-1 11) and later (Gr 421, G III,58f.) he ascribes both kinds of freedom 
to human agents. 
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(3) In the letter to Wedderkopf the argument for the necessity of all events 
is not based (at least not explicitly) on the analytic theory of truth, but rather 
on the nature of God and the principle of sufficient reason. This latter, more 
theological argument against contingency is by far the one most often 
addressed by Leibniz in his writings; and we shall be concerned with it in 
most of the present essay. 
The letter to Wedderkopf is an exceptional text. It is hard to regard as 
merely tentative a view which Leibniz communicated to an eminent person 
with whom he was by no means intimate. But he may not have held the 
extreme necessitarian position for any length of time. It seems not to  have 
been held in a fragment on free will written just a few months before or after 
the letter (A VI,i,540f.).s 
1.2 Things Possible in Their Own Nature 
The necessitarian position was soon replaced by a theory which Leibniz 
repeated incessantly, publicly and privately, to the end of his career, and 
which must be regarded as his principal (and most confident) solution to  the 
problem of contingency. The basic idea of this solution is very clearly stated 
in a paper on freedom written about 1681. 
But we must say that God wills the best by His own nature. Therefore He wills necessarily, 
you will say. I shall say with St. Augustine that that necessity is happy. But surely it follows 
from this that things exist necessar~ly. Why? Because a contradiction is implied by the 
non-existence of that which God wills to exist? I deny that that proposition is absolutely 
true. Otherwise those things which God does not will would not be possible. For they 
remain possible, even if they are not chosen by God. It is possible indeed that even that 
should exist which God does not will to exist, because it would be able to exist of its own 
nature if God willed that it exist, But God cannot will that it exist. I agree; yet it remains 
possible in its own nature, even if it is not possible in respect to thedivine will. For we have 
defined possible in its own nature as that which does not imply a contradiction in itself6 
even if its coexistence with God can be said in some way to  imply a contradiction. . . . 
Therefore I say: that is possible, of which there is some essence or reality, or which can 
be distinctly understood. . . . If God had decreed that no real line must be found which 
should be incommensurable wlth other real lines (I call real a line that actually bounds 
some body), it would not therefore follow that the existence of an incommensurable line 
impl~es a contradiction, even if God, from the principle of perfection, could not fail to 
ordain in this way. (Gr 289f.) 
On this view the actual world, and things that exist in it, are not necessary 
but contingent, because other worlds are possible in which those things would 
not exist. And the possibility of those other worlds does not depend on the 
possibility of God's choosing them. It  is enough, for the contingency of the 
actual world, if the other possible worlds are "possible in their own nature" 
or "do not imply a contradiction in themselves," considered apart from 
God's choice. 
Leibniz still takes this position in the Theodicy. He reports that Abelard 
agreed "that it can well be said that that man [who in fact will be damned] can 
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be saved, in respect t o  the possibility of human nature, which is capable of 
salvation, but that it cannot be said that God can save him, in respect to God 
Himself, because it is impossible for God to  do that which He ought not to  
do." And he comments that Abelard therefore need not have held, as he did, 
that "God cannot do anything but that which He does." For "the others. . . do 
not mean anything else when they say that God can save that man, and that 
He can do  that which He does not do" (T  171). The possibility of the alterna- 
tives among which God chooses is internal to them; and this internal possibility 
of the alternatives is enough to  make God's choice free. 
In a word, when one speaks of thepossibility of a thing it is not a question ofthe causes 
that can br~ngabout  or prevent itsactual existence: otherwise one would change the nature 
of the terms and render useless thedistinction between the possibleand the actual.. . .That 
is why, when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary, and brings in the consideration of 
what God wills or chooses, one alters the issue. For God chooses among the possibles, 
and for that very reason He chooses freely, and 1s not compelled; there would be neither 
choice nor freedom if there were but one course possible. (T235; cf. T44,45,228,230-232, 
234, 367) 
The first problem about this theory is to understand what is meant by 
"possible in its own nature." If a certain world is inferior and so cannot be 
chosen by God, is that not by virtue of its own nature? Why, then, should we 
not say that it is impossible in its own nature? Here we must think of the 
nature or concept of a possible world as built up by stages. We start with the 
notion of a group of monads, of the different degrees of distinctness with 
which each perceives the others, and of the geometrical configurations and 
motions that are expressed by their perceptions and have thus a phenomenal 
reality. If there are spirits among the created monads of the world in 
question, we include their thoughts, actions, speeches, and cultural produc- 
tions. Thus is built up what we may call the basic concept of a possible world. 
It is to include everything that happens in that world, but not everything that 
is true about its relation to God's will. By analogy with the complete concept 
of an individual, we can also speak of the complete concept of a possible 
world, which is to be fuller than the basicconcept and contain everythingthat 
is true about the possible world, including whether it is the best, or nearly the 
best, or far from the best, of all possible worlds, and whether God therefore 
chooses or rejects it.7 We may take it to be Leibniz's position that a world is 
possible in its own nature if its basic concept contains no internal contradic- 
tion, and nothing that is incompatible with its actuality so long as certain 
determinants of God's choice are kept out of the picture; its complete concept 
may contain God's rejecting it, but that does not keep it from being possible 
in its own nature. 
Interesting questions arise about just what is to  be included in a world's 
basic concept. ( I )  Are any concepts of other possible worlds included? It 
might seem natural to exclude them, since we are trying to capture the idea of 
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a possibility that is internal to one possibIe world. And by excluding them we 
can be certain of not including enough information to imply God's rejection 
of the world to  which the basic concept belongs. On the other hand, the 
solution of the problem of contingency does not strictly require theexclusion 
of this information if the right information about God is excluded. 
(2) Are any facts about God included in basic concepts of worlds? Leibniz 
refers to the world as "the Aggregate of finite things" (G VII,302/L 4 ~ 6 ) , ~  
which presumably excludes God. O n  the other hand, he speaks of the possible 
things that are the objects of God's choice as containing in their concepts 
certain decisions of God, considered as possible, so  that God chooses among 
certain possible actions of His own, as well as among possible creatures 
(C 23f.; C 11,4941 /L-A 55-57; cf. G 1,360). This causes no problem, provided 
that the divine decisions that are included in the objects of God's choice are 
non-comparative decisions concerned only with the laws or  order of the 
world to which they belong. What is important for Leibnizk treatment of 
contingency is that the basic concepts of possible worlds do not contain God's 
choice among possible worlds. If in addition they do  not include the fact that 
God is perfectly good, they can contain concepts of other possible worlds, 
without damage to  the theory of contingency. 
1.3 Hypothetical Necessity 
Even if a satisfactory explanation can be given of what it is for a world (or 
more generally, a state of affairs or thing) to be possible in its own nature, 
there remains an important objection to  Leibniz's use of this notion in 
accounting for contingency. His claim is that the actuality of this world is 
contingent because other worlds remain possible in their own natures even if 
they are not possible in relation to God's will. But in presenting this theory of 
contingency, Leibniz at least sometimes seems to admit that it is necessary 
that God chooses this world (Gr 289f., Conf 64f.). And if it is necessary that 
God chooses this world, and it follows necessarily from that that this world is 
actual, must not the actuality of this world be necessary and not contingent? 
As Curley puts it, 
It is an uncontrovers~al truth of modal logic that i f p  IS necessary a n d p  entails q, then q is 
necessary. S o  ~f ~t is (absolutely) necessary that God choose the best, and if the existence 
of the best world IS (hypothetically) necessary in relation to his choice, then it is (absolutely) 
necessary that the best world exist.9 
Leibniz makes much use of the term "hypotheticalIy necessary," which 
Curley rightly brings in here. Leibniz says repeatedly that contingent truths 
are hypothetically but not absolutely necessary (e.g., in $13 of the Discourse 
on Metaphysics). "Hypothetical necessity" is normally, as he recognized 
(G III,400/ W 48 l), a synonym of "necessity of the consequence." So  he seems 
to be using the traditional distinction between necessity of the consequence 
and necessity of the consequent: " I f p  then necessarily q""J can mean either 
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that "If p then q" is necessary (necessity of the consequence), or that if "p" is 
true then "q" is necessary (necessity of the consequent). But then necessity of 
the consequence (hypothetical necessity) combined with necessity of the 
antecedent implies necessity of the consequent. If "p" and "If p then q" are 
both necessary, then "q" is necessary. 
Leibniz raised this very objection against himself in his "first Theodicy," 
written in dialogue form in 1673 as The Philosopher's Confession, and given 
to ArnauId and others." 
God's existence is necessary. From it follow the sins that are contained in [this actual] 
serles of th~ngs. What follows from the necessary IS necessary. Therefore the sins are 
necessary. (Conf 64) 
The answer that Leibniz first wrote was: 
I reply that it is false that whatever follows from what is necessary is necessary. From 
truths, to be sure, nothing follows that is not true. Yet since a part~cular [concIus~on] can 
follow from purely un~versal Ipremises], as In [the syllogistic figures] Darapti and 
Felapton, why not someth~ng contingent from something necessary? (Conf 64)1* 
Thus baldly stated, Leibniz's answer seems simply to ignore the modal axiom 
appealed to by CurIey. Leibniz acknowledged the axiom, however, at least 
by 1675, when he wrote, "Whatever is incompatible with something necessary 
is impossible." He therefore distinguished two types of necessity and impossi- 
bility. "The concept of the impossible is twofold: that which has no essence; 
and that which has no existence or which neither was nor is nor will be, and 
which is incompatible with God or with existence or with the reason which 
makes things to be rather than not."l3 Leibniz accordingly corrected his 
answer in the manuscript of The Philosopher's Confession (probably some- 
time between 1673 and 1677), to incorporate such a distinction: 
I reply that it is false that whatever foilows from what is necessary through Itself, is 
necessary rhrouxh itself From truths, to be sure, nothing follows that is not true. Yet slnce 
a particular [conclusion] can follow from purely universal [premises], as in [thesyllogist~c 
figures] Darap t~  and Felapton, why may not something that is contingent, or necessaryon 
the hvpothesu of something else, follow from something that is necessary through itself! 
(Conf 64)14 
He also added, 
In this place we call necessary only that which is necessary through ~tself--that is, w h ~ c h  
has the reason of its existence and truth within itself. Such are the Geometr~cal truths, and 
of existing th~ngs only GOD. The others, which follow from thesupposition of this series 
of things-that is, from the harmony of things-or from the Existence of GOD, are 
rontlngent through rhemselves and only hypothetically necessary. . . . (Conf 66)'5 
Here it is clear that in spite of the traditional terminology of hypothetical 
necessity, the absolute or per se necessity that Leibniz denies in affirming 
contingency is something more than the traditional necessity of the conse- 
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quent. In his conception of hypothetical necessity the absolute necessity or 
contingency of the antecedent is no more important than the externality of the 
antecedent to the consequent. What folows necessarily from what is necessary 
through itself is certainly necessary by necessity of the consequent, in the 
traditional sense. It is not necessary through itself, however, but only hypo- 
thetically necessary, and contingent, in Leibniz's sense, if the antecedent from 
which it follows is external to it, and not contained in its own nature. The 
phrase Leibniz uses here, "necessary ex  alterius hypothesi" ("necessary on the 
hypothesis of something else") expresses his meaning better than the more 
usual "necessary ex  hyporhesi." 
This conception of hypothetical necessity is expressed only slightly less 
clearIy in another early passage. On November 27, 1677, Leibniz recorded 
his side of a co~lversation with Bishop Nicholas Steno (Niels Stensen), who 
read The Philosopher's Confession and commented on it.16 In this memo- 
randum Leibniz says that "there is an absolute necessity when a thing cannot 
even be understood, but implies a contradiction in terms," and "there is a 
hypothetical necessity when a thing's being some other way can indeed be 
understood through itself, but it is necessarily this way, non-essentially [per 
accidensj, on account of other things outside itself already presupposed" 
(Gr 270f.). 
In his later writings Leibniz is usually less explicit about his interpretation 
of hypothetical necessity, and indeed does not remain consistent on the point. 
The conception we have found in his early work occurs in a paper dating from 
1692 or later (according to Schepers; Grua dated in 1677): 
All thlngs therefore have a reason, either In themselves and from their terms [in se et ex 
rermmis], as thlngs that are necessary through themselves [per se]; or  from elsewhere, as  
things that are free and contingent or, so to speak, non-essentially or hypothetically [per 
accrdens sive ex hypothes~] necessary. ( G r  273; cf. G r  297f. 116811, T 53 [1710]) 
The evidence that Leibniz's adherence to this position was not consistent 
and unwavering has to do with the question whether effects that are contin- 
gent in the sense of being only hypothetically necessary must have contingent 
causes. There are a paper from about 1683 (Gr 3 IOf.) and a reading note from 
about 1695 (Gr 353) that hint at, but do not unambiguously imply, an affirma- 
tive answer to this question. And writing to Arnauld in 1686, Leibnizsays that 
"the possibilities of individuals or of contingent truths contain in their 
concept the possibility of their causes, namely of the free decisions of God" 
(G II,51 /L-A 56). Similarly, Leibniz seems to think that the possibility of an 
effect requires the possibility, though not the actuality, of some cause of it, 
when he says, in a letter of 1714 to Louis Bourguet, "Generally speaking, in 
order for a being to be possible, it suffices that its efficient cause be possible; I 
except the supreme efficient cause, which must exist in fact" (G 111, 572/L 
661).'7 In neither of these passages is it explicit that the possibility of the 
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cause is required for a thing t o  be possible in itself, nor how far up theexplan- 
atory chain the possibility of the cause must extend. Perhaps it is enough if 
particular divine decrees or decisions to  establish such and such laws of 
nature are possible in themselves, or included in consistent basic concepts of 
worlds; perhaps they need not be possible in relation to God's perfect good- 
ness. But it is natural to read these passages as incompatible with the view that 
contingency is definable in terms of the internal possibility of basic (but 
incomplete) concepts of alternative worlds. 
On the other hand, Leibniz does say in the Theodicy that considerations 
about what God chooses, and in general about the causes of a thing, are not 
relevant to the question of the thing" possibility (T 235, quoted in section 1.2 
above). And it would not be plausible to interpret Leibniz there as meaning 
only that the actuality of the causes is irrelevant, while tacitly assuming that 
the possibility of the causes is relevant; for he is explicitly attacking Abelard, 
whom he reads (T 171) as arguing, not merely from the non-actuality, but 
from the alleged impossibility of God's having chosen otherwise than He did. 
Perhaps Leibniz in his later work found it easier to vacillate on the question 
whether a contingent effect can follow by hypothetical necessity from an 
absolutely necessary cause, because the question had lost some of its impor- 
tance for him. For, as we shall see, he had come to believe that God's choice of 
this world to actualize is contingent, and therefore that contingent existences 
do have a contingent cause in God. Nevertheless the idea that it is enough for 
contingency that there are a plurality of alternatives for God's choice that are 
possible in themselves is more clearly and emphatically presented in the 
neodicy than any other well articulated solution to the problem of contingency. 
1.4 The Reality of Choice 
We may be tempted to object that the conception of the contingent as that 
which has some alternative that is possible in itself(if not in relation to  God) 
does not really show how there can be any contingency in the Leibnizian 
universe, nor how God's choice among possible worlds can be free. For what 
is contingent in this Leibnizian sense may still be necessary by necessity of 
the consequent-that is, absolutely necessary-in the traditional (and 
twentieth century) sense. And God's choice of this world to actualize may be 
necessitated by His nature as perfectly good, even if other worlds remain 
possible in themselves. If this is all that Leibniz has to offer in defense of 
contingency, his system may be thought as necessitarian as Spinoza's. 
Most of what is said in this objection is right, in a way; but it overlooks the 
nature of Leibniz's interest in free will and contingency, and his stated view of 
the difference between his determinism and Spinoza's. His interest in contin- 
gency is rooted in his interest in divine and human free will-with respect to 
which he is, after all, a compatibilist. We must let him define for himself what 
kind of compatibilist he is. At one time, as we have seen, he regarded unquali- 
fied necessity as compatible with freedom. Later his principal reason for 
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insisting on some sort of contingency in connection with free action seems to 
have been to insure the reality of choice-to insure that what happens is really 
influenced by final causes and judgments of value. 
This is the point that Leibniz most often insists on in distinguishing his 
views about necessity from Spinoza's. Spinoza held that there are no final 
causes in nature, that God does not act for an end, and that things are called 
good or bad with regard only to how they affect us, being quite indifferent to 
God (Ethics, I, Appendix). He said that actual intellect and will must be 
referred to God-as-an-effect (natura naturata) and not to God-as-a-cause 
(natura naturans) (Ethics, I, prop. 31), and denied that a divine intellect or 
will could resemble ours in anything more than name alone (Ethics, I, 
prop. 17, schol.). Indeed there is no room in Spinoza's system for God to 
choose, for there is nothing to be excluded by His choice. By the necessity of 
the divine nature, since it is infinite in Spinoza's sense, absolutely everything 
possible must be actual (Ethics, I, prop. 16). 
On all of these points Leibniz disagreed with Spinoza. Even on the most 
extremely necessitarian interpretation of his system, God's choice has a real 
and important role to  play. For even if God's choice of this world is necessary, 
other worlds are possible in their own nature, and are not excluded without 
God's choice but only through (the necessity of) His choosing this one. God's 
choice is an indispensable link in the chain of explanation for the actuality of 
this world. "The nature of things, taken without intelligence and without 
choice, has nothing sufficiently determining" (T 350). The comparative value 
of the different worlds also has a crucial explanatory role, in which Leibniz 
employs a notion of final cause.18 
Leibniz emphasizes this disagreement in his discussions of Spinoza, early 
and late. In the period 1676-1678, near the time of Spinoza's death, Leibniz 
commented, "But it is not at all to be thought that all things follow from God's 
nature without any intervention of the will" (G 1,124; cf, Gr 279), and "Even 
if it is true that not everything happens for the sake of men, it still does not 
follow that [God] acts without will or understanding of the good" (G I,150/L 
205). In the Theodicy he wrote, 
Spinoza . . . appears to haveexplicitly taught a blind necessity, havingdenied to  the author 
of things understanding and will, and imagining that good and perfection relate only to us 
and not to Hlm. It is true that Spinoza's opinion on this subject is somewhat obscure. . . . 
Nevertheless, as far as one can understand him, he acknowledges no goodness in God, 
properly speaking, and he teaches that all things exist by the necessity of the Divine nature, 
without God making any choice. We will not amuse ourselves here in refutlng a n  opinion 
so  bad, and indeed so inexplicable. Our own is founded on the nature of the possibles- 
that is to say, of the things that do not mply  any contradiction. (T 173;cf. T 174,371-374) 
If we will allow Leibniz to disagree with Spinoza in his own way, rather than 
in some way that we might impose on him, this should be enough to show that 
his determinism is not properly called Spinozistic. 
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1.5 Moral Necessity 
When Leibniz says that he opposes a "brute" or "blind" necessity (T 174, 
349), he means (sometimes with explicit reference to Spinoza) a necessity that 
denies to  God intelligence and choice (T371-372). Similarly, in the Theodicyl9 
he admits a "moral" but not a "metaphysical" necessity of God's choosing the 
best. Leibniz usually gives little or no explanation of this distinction; and one 
might be tempted to  take it as a promissory note for a less strongly necessi- 
tarian theory which he was unable to  provide in detail. But in fact "morally 
necessary" had a precise meaning. The morally necessary is what one morally 
ought to  do. In his early jurisprudential writings (1671-1678) Leibniz enun- 
ciated a system of moral modalities (a very rudimentary deontic logic) in 
terms of what is possible, impossible, necessary, or contingent (i.e., omissible 
or not necessary) "to be done by a good man" (A VI,i,465ff.). "I call morally 
impossible that which it is not possible to do without committing a sin" 
(A IV,i,47 I ) ,  "Obligation . . . is a moral necessity-that is, a necessity imposed 
on him who wants to  keep the name of 'a good man'" (Gr 608). Similarly, 
"duty is whatever is necessary in the perfectly just" (C 517). Accordingly, 
when Leibniz says that God's choice of the best is morally necessary, we must 
take him to mean that it is necessary that if God did not choose the best, He 
would not be perfectly good. It is noteworthy that Clarke, his contemporary, 
did take this to be Leibniz's meaning. Clarke's examples of moral necessity 
are "that a good Being, continuing t o  be Good, cannot do Evil; or a wise 
Being, continuing to be Wise, cannot act unwisely; or a veracious Person, 
continuing to  be veracious, cannot tell a Lie" (G VII,423). (Clarke also 
thought this a "figurative" and philosophicalIy uninteresting sense of 
"necessity .") 
It is in keeping with this conception that the Theodicy speaks of being 
"necessitated morally by wisdom" (T 237), identifies moral necessity with "the 
choice of the wise, worthy of his wisdom" (Preliminary Discourse, §2), and 
says that "it is a moral necessity that the wisest is obliged to choose the best" 
(T 230). And in some of his discussions of moral necessity Leibniz's concern 
for the reality of choice comes together pretty explicitly with his idea of the 
contingent as that which receives necessity only from outside itself and has 
alternatives that are possible in themselves. He  distinguishes between 
"metaphysical necessity, which leaves no place for any choice, presenting 
only one possible object, and moral necessity, which obliges the wisest t o  
choose the best" (T 367), and says, 
But that sort of necessity which does not destroy the possibility of the contrary has that 
name only by analogy. It becomes effective, not  by the essence of things alone, but by that 
which is outside them and above them, namely by the will of God. This necessity is called 
moral, because with the wise, what is necessary and what ought to  be areequivalent things. 
(Abridgment, VIII [G VI,386]) 
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2.0 Leibniz's Second Main Solution 
We have now explored the set of ideas that constitute the innermost and 
surest bastion of Leibniz's defenses against the denial of contingency. Even if 
everything actual is necessarily actualized by God, on account of His good- 
ness, the things that God chooses are not necessary through themselves, but 
only on the hypothesis of something external to  them, and they have alterna- 
tives that are possible in themselves. They are therefore in a certain sense 
contingent, and only hypothetically necessary. Leibniz finds contingency in 
this sense worth defending, because it preserves the reality of God's choice, 
distinguishing the "moral" necessity that he ascribes to God's action from the 
"brute" or "blind" necessity that he thinks belongs to it in Spinoza's system. 
Leibniz adhered to these views from I673 to the end of his life. 
But we have yet to examine the outer walls of his castle of contingency. In 
the end Leibniz denied, not only that this world, which in fact is actual, is 
necessary through itself, but also that it is necessarily actualized by God. In 
several papers from the 1680s we see him struggling to justify this denial and 
fit it into his philosophy. But by 1690 he had made much progress in under- 
standing the problem, and had attained a solution that seems to have satisfied 
him fairly well. 
2.1 The Contingency of Which World Is Best 
According to Leibniz, this world, rather than any other possible world, is 
actual because God chooses to actualize whatever is best, and this is the best 
of all possible worlds. Therefore, if it is contingent that this world is actual, it 
must either be contingent that God chooses whatever is best, or else contin- 
gent that this is the best. Which is it that is contingent? Leibniz explicitly 
raised this question in several papers written between 1689 and 1706; he 
tended to favor the answer that it is contingent that this world is the best. 
In one note from about 1695 he raises the question without answering it: 
The formal cause [of the knowability of future contingents] is the coherence of terms, o r  
the fact that the pred~cate lnheres in the subject, even sf the cause why it ~nheres depends 
on two th~ngs, the universal bestness and God's declslon to choose the best. O r  1s God's 
general declslon necessary.20Or is it not that "This is the best" IS true, but not necessary; ~t 
1s true but not demonstrable a prlon. Is ~t therefore cont~ngent? (Gr 351) 
Although the question is not answered here, Leibniz's inclination is clear. 
It is explicit in other texts, including the important paper "On Contingency," 
from 1689 or 1690, the earliest work known to me in which Leibniz defined 
the a1ternatives:Zl 
We must see whether if we suppose that this proposition is necessary: the proposrtron 
which has the greater reason for exlsrrng exurs, it follows that the proposlt~on which has 
the greater reason for existing is necessary. But the inference 1s rlghtly rejected. For if the 
definition of a necessary proposition IS, that ~ t s  truth can be demonstrated with geometrical 
rigor, then it can indeed happen that this proposltlon can be demonstrated: every truth, 
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and only a trurh, has the greater reason, or this one: God a1tva.v~ acts most wisely. But ~t 
will not therefore be possible to  demonstrate this proposition: conrtngent proposirzon A 
has the greater reason, or contingenl proposrtron A 1s conformed ro rhe divlne u~rsdom. 
And therefore also it does not follow that contingent proposition A is necessary. And 
therefore even if it were conceded that it 1s necessary that God chooses the best, orthat  the 
best is necessary, stdl ~t does not follow that that whlch is chosen is necessary, since no 
demonstration that it is the best is given. (Gr 305f.) 
Here Leibniz is rather careful not to assert that it is necessary that God 
chooses the best. But he does commit himself to  the view that it is not neces- 
sary that this (which God has chosen) is the best, although it is in fact the best. 
Of the two ways in which the necessity of that which God has chosen couId be 
denied, Leibniz is readier here to  deny the necessity of "This is the best" than 
the necessity of "God chooses the best." 
His stance is the same in a note written in the early 1690s: 
Or does this follow: "This proposltion is necessary: God does the best, Therefore that 
which God does 1s necessary"? The inference 1s not valid For the conclus~on follows the 
weaker part. But it is not demonstrable that a certaln thing is the best, nor, therefore, [can 
it be demonstrated] what must be done. Or shall we rather say that this proposition too, 
"God does the best," is not necessary but only certain? The previous opinion appears to be 
best, since thls proposition: A is the best, is certain, but is not necessary since ~t cannot be 
demonstrated (Gr 336) 
We do  not have to deny the necessity of "God does the best," since that which 
is the best is not necessarily the best. 
In another text, the latest and most important of the series, Leibniz begins 
by stating again that "This is the best" is not necessary even if "That which is 
the best is chosen" is necessary. He says that  he does not know whether God's 
not choosing the best implies acontradiction. But he asserts flatly that "This is 
the best," though true, "is not demonstrable by a demonstration that shows 
that the contrary implies a contradiction." Then he seems to  change his mind, 
however, and shifts to  a less cautious position on the necessity of God's 
choosing the best: 
It is the same argument: God wlllsnecessarily the work that is most worthy of His wisdom. 
I say that He wills ~ t ,  but not necessarily, because although this work is the most worthy, 
that is not a necessary t r ~ t h . ~ 2  It is true that this proposition: God wills the work that is 
most worthy of Him, is necessary. But it is not true that He wiIls it necessarily. For  this 
proposltion: This work IS the most worthy, is not a necessary truth; it is indemonstrable, 
contingent, a truth of fact. (Gr 493) 
The argument here turns on an ambiguity of "necessarily." Leibniz saw it as 
an  ambiguity of scope. He accepts the "necessarily" as "applied to the copula" 
(that is, t o  the whole proposition), but not as applied to "what is contained in 
the copula" (that is, as internal t o  the predicate). He wilI affirm that "God is 
necessarily the one who wills the best. But not the one who necessarily wills 
the best" (Gr 494). It is misleading, however, for Leibniz to  make an  issue of 
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which verb "necessarily" modifies. The crucial point in the ambiguity is 
whether the necessity applies de re t o  the object that  God in fact wills. This 
point could be brought out by distinguishing wide from narrow scope of the 
definite description operator in "God necessarily wills the work that is most 
worthy of His wisdom." If it has wide scope, the necessity applies de re t o  the 
work, and the sense of the proposition is, "The work that is most worthy of 
God's wisdom is such that it is necessary that God wills itw-which Leibniz 
denies. But if the definite description operator has narrow scope, the sense is 
rather, "It is necessary that God wills whatever work is most worthy of His 
wisdomm-which Leibniz here accepts. Of course it would be anachronistic 
to expect Leibniz to  have made the point in that way. 
The date of this text deserves comment. I t  cannot possibly have been 
written before 1706, because it is a note made in reading the third volume of 
Bayle's Rkponses aux questions d'un provincial, which was published a t  the 
end of the previous year.23 This refutes Rescher's suggestion that it was only 
"until the year 1686, when his mature philosophy took form" that Leibniz 
preferred denying the necessity of "This is the best"to denying the necessity of 
"God chooses the best."24 
It should also be noted that the proposition, "God wills necessarily the 
work that is most worthy of His wisdom," which is quoted from Bayle, is 
discussed again (with the same reference to  Bayle) in the Theodic-y, where it is 
denied (T 237). Leibniz does not make there the distinctions that he had 
made in the note from 1706, but only appeals to the difference between 
metaphysical and moral necessity. What he is denying in the Theodicy, 
however, should probably be understood in the light of the earlier note. 
2.2 Necessity, Demonstrability, and Infinite Analysis 
The thesis that the property of being the best of all possible worlds belongs 
only contingently to the world that has it has seemed so evidently false to 
some recent philosophers that they have been unwilling to regard it as a part 
of Leibniz's mature philosophy. "That this world is the best possible world is 
presumably a necessary fact," according to ~ u r l e ~ ; ~ ~  and Rescher says, "it is 
difficult to  see how what is best could avoid being determined with necessita- 
tion when the substances are conceived sub r a t i ~ n e ~ o s s i b i l i t a t i s . " ~ ~  That this 
world is the best does not depend on which world exists, or is actual, or chosen 
by God. Leibniz insists that the values of possible things are completely 
independent of God's will.*' The bestness of this world is rather the ground of 
its being chosen by God and hence actual and existent. 
Nevertheless, Leibniz did in several of his later writings assert that the 
bestness of that which is best is contingent, as we have seen. And I d o  not 
know of any text from the mature period of his philosophy in which he asserts 
or implies the opposite. How can he have thought what he appears to have 
thought? The explanation is to  be sought in the idea, which occurs in all of 
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the crucial passages, that it cannot be demonstrated what is best. Leibniz 
brings in here, implicitly, his very formal ideal of demonstration by analysis 
in a finite number of steps. For of all his solutions to  the theological version of 
the problem of contingency, that which proceeds by denying the necessity of 
facts about which things are best is the most clearly connected with his 
conception of contingency in terms of infinite analysis. 
This conception is indeed rather fully stated in the earliest of the papers in 
which we have found Leibniz saying that it is contingent what is the best. 
And here" 1s uncovered the inner d~s t~nc t ion  between necessary and contlngent truths, 
whlch no one will easily understand unless he has some tincture of Mathematics-namely, 
that in necessary propos~t~ons  one arrives, by an analysls continued to  some polnt, at an 
identical equation (and t h ~ s  very t h ~ n g  1s to demonstrate a truth In geometrical rigor), but 
in contlngent propos~tions the analysis proceeds to ~ n f ~ n i t y  b  reasons of reasons, so that 
Indeed one never has a full demonstratton, although there IS always, underneath, areason 
for the truth. even ~ f "  it is perfectly understood only by God, who alone goes through an 
infin~te series in one act of the mind. (Cr 303) 
This is Leibniz's solution to the version of the problem of contingency that 
has fascinated his twentieth century readers, the version that asks, "if the 
concept of having the predicate a t  a given time inheres in the concept of the 
subject, how can the subject then lack the predicate without contradiction 
andT0 impossibility, and without loss of its concept?" (FC 179/L 264). The 
solution is that a predicate can be contained in the concept of a subject with- 
out this containment being provable by analysis in a finite number of steps. 
Leibniz will say that in such a case the subject's lacking the predicatedoes not 
"imply a contradiction,"and that its having the predicatecannot beudemon- 
strated" and is contingent (FC I81/L 264; similarly at C 17/SG 346f.; cf. C 
376f., 387/P 66, 76f.). 
An example may help us to  understand how such cases may arise. It may be 
that there is a property, 4, such that for every natural number n, it can be 
proved that n has d,, but the universal generalization that every natural 
number has d, cannot be proved except by provingfirst that 7 hascp, then that 
4 has d,, and so on until every natural number has been accounted for-a task 
that can never be completed. In this case it is a purely mathematical truth 
that every naturaI number has 4,  but it cannot be demonstrated. And it is 
a pureIy mathematical falsehood that some natural number lacks d,, but no 
contradiction can be derived from it in a finite number of steps. Tarski 
decided t o  say that a system of which these conditions hold, but in which 
"Some natural number lacks 4" can be proved, is consistent, but not 
w-consi~tent.~' He thus reserved the use of "consistent" and "inconsistent," 
without qualification, t o  express proof-theoretical notions rather than  
notions of mathematical possibility and mathematical falsity. Similarly, 
Leibniz reserves "implies a contradiction" to  express a proof-theoretical 
notion rather than the notion of conceptual falsity or being false purely by 
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virtue of the relations of concepts. He thinks, of course, that the latter notion 
is expressed simply by "false." 
It is not difficult to  see how it would follow, from this conception of contin- 
gency, that it is contingent which possible world is the best. For one would 
presumably have to  consider infinitely many aspects of a world in order to  
assign a value to it as a whole. And then one would have to  compare infinitely 
many worlds in order to determine which is best. It could not be determined 
by any finite analysis; hence it is contingent. Several commentators have 
explained Leibniz's reasoning along these lines,32 and Leibniz himself did so. 
In a paper on "Necessary and Contingent Truths" (Couturat's title), which 
may contain the earliest surviving statement of his infinite analysis conception 
of contingency, he points out that the universe has infinitely many aspects, 
and adds, 
Indeed, even if one could know the whole series of the universe, one still could not give the 
reason for it, unless one had set up a comparison of it with all the other possible [series], 
From t h ~ s  it IS clear why no demonstration ofany contingent propos~tion can be found, no 
matter how far the analysis of concepts IS continued (C 19/SG 349 [dated 1678 by 
Schepers]; cf Gr 343 [from the early 1690~1) 
There remain difficult questions, never resolved by Leibniz o r  his commen- 
tators, about just how analysis is supposed to work in the relevant cases. 
Analysis, for Leibniz and the seventeenth century, was a method of proof 
beginning with the conclusion to be proved and working back to  the axioms 
from which it follows-though in an  infinite analysis the axioms are never 
reached. The method that begins with the axioms was called synthesis.33 In 
conformity with this distinction, Leibniz described finite and infinite analyses 
as proceeding from the proposition to  be proved, by substituting definitions, 
or parts of definitions, for its terms (FC 181f./L 264f.). But the process of 
determining which is the best of all possible worlds by comparing the values 
of all the worlds seems likely to be a synthesis, rather than an analysis, in this 
sense. Indeed Leibniz gives us no idea how one would even begin ananalysis, 
finite or infinite, to  determine which world is the best possible, although it is 
clear that he thought the infinite number of worlds to be compared is one 
ground of the contingency of God's choice of this world. Perhaps something 
like the following form of analysis is intended. Let "W*" be a proper name of 
the world that happens to  be actual. An analysis of "W* = the best of all 
possible worlds" will require the replacement of one or both sides of the 
equation by an  analysans. But in order to  reduce the equation to identities by 
such replacement we would need on the right-hand side an  analysans includ- 
ing a statement of the complete (or at least the basic) concepts of a11 possible 
worlds; and that is not finitely statable. 
Another difficulty is that while it does seem that it could not be proved in a 
finite number of steps that a certain world is the best possibIe, there might 
perhaps be a finite proof that a certain world, or any world of a certain sort, is 
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not the best possible. Leibniz himself seems to  have thought it could be 
demonstrated that no world in which God damns the innocent is the best. 
The damnat~on of the Innocent IS indeed poss~ble In ~tself, or something that does not 
imply a contradiction; but it IS not possibIefor God . For we do not need to exam~ne the 
whole harmony of things In order to know whether God is golng to damn someone 
Innocent eternalIp. (Gr 300) 
Here Leibniz seems to be confronted with a truth, "No one innocent will be 
damned eternally," which satisfies one of his criteria for contingency (its 
contrary is possible in itself), but not the other (it would not require an  infinite 
analysis to  prove it). Leibniz does not tell us how to  resolve this conflict; 
indeed I doubt that  he realized its existence. 
We may also be tempted to object that the infinite analysis conception of 
contingency represents contingency as illusory, o r  at best merely relative to  
our intellectual incapacity (as Spinoza had regarded it: Ethics, I, prop. 33, 
schol. 1). It is natural to conclude that for Leibniz, as Lovejoy has put it, 
"though we are unable to  attain an intuitive apprehension of the necessity 
[of a judgment which appears to  us as contingent], . . . we can nevertheless be 
sure that the necessity is there, and is recognized by the mind of ~ o d . " ~ ~  
Russell took a similar view in 1903, when he wrote, "Where an  infinite 
analysis, which only God can perform, is required to exhibit the contradiction, 
the opposite will seem to be not contradictory"; he did not think the alterna- 
tive suggestion, "that the denial of an  analytic truth might be not self- 
contradictory," would commend itself to  ~ e i b n i z . ~ '  
This objection rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Leibniz's 
conception of necessity and contingency. The distinction between them "is 
drawn on logical grounds aIone," as Rescher rightly points It is not an 
epistemological distinction, and is not based on a relation in which contingent 
propositions stand to  us but not to God. It is based on a difference in the 
logical form of the reasons by virtue of which propositions of the two sorts 
are true. Contingent truths are just as contingent for God as they are for us, 
and He can no more demonstrate them than we can; for not even He can "see 
. . . the end of the analysis, since there is no end" (FC 182, 184/L 265f.).37 
Leibniz does say that God can know contingent truths a priori (that is, 
through their reasons), and that we cannot. But these epistemological relations 
are not constiiutive of contingency; they are only consequences of the logical 
property that is constitutive of contingency. 
Two initially plausible principles about (IogicaI) necessity are that whatever 
is true purely by virtue of the relations of concepts is necessary, and that 
whatever is necessary must be logically demonstrable. Leibniz seems at first 
to have assumed both of these principles. The light that was kindled for him 
by the knowledge of the analysis of infinites (C 181 SG 348) was the realization 
that the two assumptions are incompatible because some propositions that 
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are true solely by virtue of the relations of concepts are nonetheless not 
provable by anything that he would count as a demonstration. Leibniz held 
consistently to the second principle. His usual definition of the logically 
necessary is that it is that whose contrary implies a contradiction (e.g., 
Preliminary Discourse to the Theodicy, $2). And we have seen that Leibniz 
treats "implies a contradiction" as expressing a proof-theoretical property 
that does not belong to propositions whose falsity can be discovered a priori 
only through an infinite analysis (FC 181/L 264; cf. C 17/SG 346f.). The 
realization of the incompatibility of the two principles therefore enabled 
Leibniz with a clear conscience to  give up  the first principle, which had made 
his theory of truth seem to  leave no room for contingency. 
When Russell charged that the infinite analysis conception of contingency 
would a t  most yield truths that only seem to  be contingent, he was explicitly 
and mistakenly assuming that whatever is false purely by virtue of the 
relations of concepts must be self-contradictory for Leibniz. Similarly Curley 
seems t o  be assuming a conception of necessity in terms of conceptual truth, 
rather than in terms of demonstrability, when he says that the bestness of this 
world "is not rendered any the less necessary by the number of other possible 
worlds being infinite rather than finite."38 For our own use, of course, we may 
well prefer a conceptual truth conception of necessity to  a demonstrability 
conception. If so, we will rightly conclude that Leibniz's infinite analysis 
theory does not give us real contingency. But that presents no internal 
objection to Leibniz's system. The contingency we are demanding, he can 
only regard as a brute fact and a violation of the principle of sufficient reason, 
which he has no intention of admitting in his mature philosophy. 
It is just as  clear in the essay "On the Radical Origination of Things" 
(G VII,302-3081 L 486-491 [November 23, 16971) as in the letter to Wedderkopf 
(A II,i,117f./ L 146f. [May 16711) that Leibniz thinks of everything in the world 
as determined ultimately by the divine nature, and particularly by the relations 
of concepts in God's intellect. From this point of view the problem of con- 
tingency is to find a difference between ways in which facts are determined by 
relations of concepts-a difference that  is both important and plausibly 
related to  the preanalytic notions of logical necessity and contingency. The 
difference between truths that are and that are not demonstrable in a finite 
number of steps fills this role admirably. 
2.3 Contingent Connections among Possibles as Such 
As a consequence of his infinite analysis theory of contingency Leibniz 
accepted another thesis which some commentators have been most reluctant 
to admit as part of his philosophy, Russell noted in 1903 that "the view that 
infinite complexity is the defining property of the contingent has the curious 
consequence that truths about possible substances are contingent."39 Both 
Broad and Curley have claimed that Leibniz did not accept this consequence,4O 
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but their claim is untenable. That you exist in the best possibIe world is a fact 
about you conceived as a possible substance; but its contingency follows from 
what Leibniz wrote in several places about the contingency of which world 
is best. 
Indeed the idea that there are contingent connections among things 
considered as possible becomes quite important to Leibniz in the Discourse 
on  Metaphysics and correspondence with Arnauld. This is to  be expected, in 
view of Leibniz's insistence that all of the acts of any individual follow from 
the concept of that individual considered as possibIe. If it is important to our 
freedom that we be contingently connected with our actions, this following of 
our actions from our concepts must somehow be a contingent connection 
between them and us considered as possible. Accordingly Leibniz says in §13 
of the Discourse that there are two sorts of connection, one absolutely 
necessary but the other contingent, by which different events follow from the 
complete concept of a created person. 
Arnauld was perhaps the first to find this strange. He argued that on 
Leibniz's view, the connection between Adam and everything "that has 
happened and will happen t o  him and his posterity" must be necessary, 
"because," as Leibniz put it, "I consider the individual concept of Adam as 
possible," and "possible concepts in themselves do  not depend on the free 
decisions of God" (G II,28-30,40/L-A 28f., 42f.). There are two main points 
in Leibniz's reply to this objection. 
(a) "The possibles are possible before all the actual decisions of God, but 
not without presupposing sometimes the same decisions taken as possible" 
(G 11,s 1 / L-A 56). This is because the complete concept of any possible thing 
involves (as possible) some decisions that God would make (for instance, in 
establishing laws of nature) if He actualized the world to which that thing 
belongs. Here Leibniz clings to the idea that truths involving God's decisions 
are contingent. But now it seems they need not depend on what He actually 
decides; it is enough if they involve divine decisions considered as possible. 
Why the merely possible divine decisions should be thought to have this 
relevance is obscure to me. 
(b) The connection between a person, considered as possible, and the 
events of his possible world is "intrinsic" (G II,5 1 / L-A 56) and "certain" but 
not "necessary," although the failure of the connection would destroy the 
individual concept of the person (G II,52/L-A 58; cf. G I1741/L-A 44). Here 
Leibniz seems to be quite clear that his position involves contingent connec- 
tions within possible worlds, and hence contingent truths that do not depend 
on God's actual decisions, nor on which world is actuaL41 
The same view is expressed by Leibniz in other texts. 
It is of the nature of an indiv~dual substance that its concept be perfect and complete, and 
contain a11 its individual circumstances, even contingent ones, down to the least detail. . . . 
Yet these individual [circumstances] are not therefore necessary, and d o  not depend on the 
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d~vlne  intellect alone, but also on decisions of the divine will, insofar as the dec~srons 
themselves are considered a s  possible by the divine intellect. (Gr 31 1 [1683]) 
About 1695, in a reading note, he stared flatly, "There are some indemon- 
strable truths even in possible things-namely about contingent things 
regarded as possible" (Gr 353). And probably a little later he wrote that "God 
decided to create a creature whose full concept involves such a series of graces 
and free actions, although not necessarily but by such a connection as the 
nature of the thing involves" (Gr 383 [1697]). 
How can the connection between an individual substance and some of the 
properties or events involved in its concept be contingent? Leibniz offers hints 
of some answers to this question, but they are by no means so clear as his 
best-worked-out answers to the question how the existence of those creatures 
that are actual can be contingent. Three answers may be distinguished. 
(1) In $13 of the Discourse Leibniz says that the predicate of deciding to 
cross the Rubicon and winning the battle of Pharsalus is contained in the 
concept of Julius Caesar, but that it is not "necessary in itself' that those 
things happen to him. This suggests that Leibniz thought of Caesar's deciding 
not to cross the Rubicon, or his losing a t  Pharsalus, as things that are possible 
in themselves, in the same way that non-actual possible worlds are possible in 
themselves, although they are impossible on the hypothesis of something else. 
But it is hard to  make sense of this suggestion, if the source of the threatening 
necessity is in Caesar's own complete concept. That would seem to constitute 
a necessity internal to Caesar's deciding and winning. 
In the case of possible worlds I suggested42 a distinction between the 
complete concept of a world and a fragment of it, the world's "basic" concept; 
only what is contained in its basic concept determines whether a world is 
possible in itself. Leibniz had the similar idea that properties and events that 
are contingently contained in the complete concept of an individual substance 
are distinguished by not following from any incomplete and general fragment 
of it. Thus in explaining to  Arnauld how "the connection of events, though it 
is certain, is not necessary," and how he is free in taking a journey that is 
contained in his complete concept, Leibniz says, 
And there IS nothing in me, of all that can be conce~ved asgeneral, orasessence or specific 
or incomplete concept, from which one can infer that I shall take it necessarily; whereas 
from the fact that I am a man one can conclude that I am able to  think. (G II,52/L-A 58) 
Similarly Leibniz writes that the complete concept of Peter as possible 
contains "not only essential or  necessary [matters], which derive, that is, from 
incomplete or specific concepts, . . . but also . . . existentiaI (so to  speak) or 
contingent [matters]" (Gr 31 1 [1683]). The use of "essence" and "essential" 
here is significant. In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz identified the 
"essence" with the "individual concept" of a substance (DM 16), but in a later 
paper he distinguished them, using "essence" to  refer to a fragment of the 
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individual concept to  which he attributed particular importance for modality: 
Of the essence of a thing IS what belongs to ~t necessarily and perpetually; of theconcept of 
a singular thlng, however, is also what betongs to ~t contingently or by accident, o r  what 
God sees in it when He has perfectly understood it. (Gr 383 [1697]) 
But whereas the basic concept of a possible world suffices t o  distinguish it 
from all other possible worlds, a n  essence or specific concept of Caesar that 
left out his decision to cross the Rubicon would not suffice to distinguish him 
from all other possible individuals, for  "a concept that is still indeterminate 
even in the slightest circumstances . . . could be common to two different 
individuals" (Gr 31 1). It seems strange to say that Caesar's deciding not t o  
cross the Rubicon is possible in itseyon the ground that his decision t o  cross 
is not contained in a concept that he shares with one or  more other possible 
individuals. 
(2) A more plausible idea can be read into the statement, in $13 of the 
Discourse, that if someone did the opposite of something that is involved in 
his complete concept, "he would d o  nothing impossible in itself, although it  
is impossib!e (ex hypothesi) for that to  happen." Maybe just as God chooses 
freely because He chooses among a plurality of possible worlds, each of which 
is possible in itself even if it is impossible in relation to  God's choice, so a 
creature can act freely because he chooses among a plurality of actions, each 
of which is possible in its own nature even if it is impossible in relation to the 
complete concept of the choosing creature. If this is to work, the alternatives 
for choice must be regarded a s  somewhat general, rather than as  completely 
individual actions. Caesar's alternatives on the bank of the Rubicon, for 
example, must be crossing and not crossing, rather than Caesar's crossing and 
Caesar's not crossing. Individual concepts must be kept out of the objects of 
choice. This line of thought, therefore, does not show us a way in which 
Caesar's deciding to  cross the Rubicon can be contingent. But it does show us 
a way in which Leibniz should say that the reaIity of Caesar's choice is 
preserved. I am not sure that Leibniz really had in mind this treatment of the 
freedom of created spirits, but it would have been worth developing. 
(3) Contingent connections between possibles can be explained in terms 
of the infinite analysis theory of contingency. Leibniz gives such an explana- 
tion of the contingency of "Peter denies": "The concept of Peter is complete, 
and so involves infinite things; therefore one never arrives at a perfect 
demonstration" (C 376/P 66). Leibniz does not say here whether Peter is 
considered as actual or merely as possible. But the argument evidently works 
just as  well as if the subject is considered only as  a possible person-as 
Russell perceived with dismay. 
There are even more difficult problems, however, about how infinite 
analysis is supposed to work in this case than in the case of bestness among 
possible worlds. Leibniz mostly ignores these difficulties, and I cannot d o  
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much more here than point them out. The first is the problem of the Lucky 
Proof.43 Even if infinitely many properties and events are contained in the 
complete concept of Peter, at least one of them will be proved in the first step 
of any analysis, Why couldn't it be Peter's denial? Why couldn't we begin to 
analyze Peter's concept by saying, "Peter is a denier of Jesus and . . ."? 
Presumably such a Lucky Proof must be ruled out by some sort of restriction 
on what counts as a step in an  analysis of an individual concept, but so far as 
I know, Leibniz does not explain how this is to be done. Otl the other hand, we 
may wonder how we can even begin an  analysis of the individual concept of 
any person, as Leibniz implies we can. For  such a concept, being complete, is 
not our concept but Cod's, and we do not seem to have a definition with which 
to begin to replace it.44 
2.4 Reasons that Incline without Necessitating 
One of the things Leibniz never tired of saying about free choices is that 
their causes, motives, or reasons "incline" but do  not "necessitate." Lovejoy 
called this "misleading if edifying phraseology," and a "verbal distinction, 
absolutely meaningless in the light of [Leibniz's] other doctrines."45 One is 
tempted to agree with this harsh judgment, for Leibniz does not give much 
explanation of the difference between inclining and necessitating. But I think 
the distinction has a place in the interpretation of Leibniz we have been 
developing. 
Leibniz presents the idea of reasons that incline without necessitating, 
sometimes in connection with the notion of a choice among alternatives that 
are possible in themselves (T 45, 230; to Clarke, V,8-9), and sometimes in 
connection with the infinite analysis theory of contingency. In  the latter 
connection, which seems to  me the more illuminating of the two, Leibniz says, 
"There is the same proportion between necessity and inclination that there is 
in the Mathematicians' Analysis between exact Equation and limits that give 
an approximation" (Gr 479; cf. Gr 303 and G VI,414 [Remarks on King, 
5141). 
The preceding statement was written about 1702 in a memorandum that 
also makes clear how infinity is supposed to enter into the influence of reasons 
on the will. The word "incline" suggests the image of a balance that is tipped 
or inclined to one side or the other by the preponderance of weights; and 
"balance" (noun and verb) occurs, at  least figuratively, several times in the 
memorandum. Leibniz liked mechanical analogies for volition (T 22, G 
VII,304/L 488), and in particular that of the balance (cf. NE II,xxi,40). He 
later wrote to Clarke (V,3) that "reasons in the mind of a wise being, and 
motives in any mind whatsoever, do  that which answers to the effect produced 
by weights in a balance." Though not necessitating, the balance of motives 
determines as certainly as the balance of weights. "We always follow the 
direction toward which there is more inclination or disposition" (Gr 479); we 
never fail to  d o  so (T 43). 
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The motives that play the role of weights in the scales of volition include all 
our perceptions, subconscious as well as conscious, according to Leibniz. 
Several perceptions and inclinations contribute to the complete volition, which is the 
result of their conflict. Some of them areseparately imperceptible; the mass of these makes 
an uneasiness which pushes us without the subject of it being seen (NE II,xxi,39; cf. Gr480). 
Here the infinite makes its appearance. For in Leibniz's system the mass of 
subconscious perceptions in a finite spirit is a confused perception of the 
whole universe, in all its infinite complexity. Every fact about the world is 
perceived, and our perception of it has some influence on our will; those 
perceptions of which we are not conscious are nonetheless weighed in the 
balance en masse, by virtue of their contribution to our feelings. Our minds, 
being finite, cannot completely understand the motives of our choices, 
because they are infinitely complex. O n  the same ground the connection 
between a free decision and its ultimate reasons o r  motives will be contingent, 
and cannot be demonstrated, in the senses laid down in the infinite analysis 
theory of contingency. Much of this, including some connection between 
contingency and the infinity of influences, is explicit in the memorandum 
quoted above. Leibniz speaks there of our ignorance "of an infinity of little 
influences on us of which we are not conscious," which sometimes lets us have 
the illusion that the factors moving our will are equally balanced. And he 
immediately adds, 
That shows that it is indeed always true that ourfreedom, and that of all other intelligent 
substances right up to God Himself, is accompanied by a certain degree of indifference or 
contingency, whlch has been defined In such a way that we and those substances arenever 
necessitated, since the contrary of that which happens always remains possible or implies 
no contradict~on. (Gr 480f.) 
The reference to God should not be taken as suggesting that God has 
subconscious motives; for Leibniz's God perceives everything distinctly. But 
Leibniz did say that "God had infinite reasons competing with each other, 
which He considered when He judged this possible universe worthy to be 
chosen"; he offered it as an explanation of why the truth ofUThis series ofthe 
universe is the best" cannot be known apriori by us (Gr 343). God's reasons, 
like ours, incline but do not necessitate, because they are involved in a conflict 
of such infinite complexity that the resultingvolition cannot be demonstrated 
(in the strict sense) from them.46 
2.5 Is "6od chooses what is best" Contingent? 
The contingency of "God chooses this world" could be explained and 
defended by holding either that "God chooses what is best" is contingent or 
that "This world is the best" is contingent. We have seen that Leibniz prefers 
the latter alternative; but he explicitly rejects the other in only one of the texts 
we examined. More often he leaves open the possibiIity of holding that both 
are contingent. There seems to have been more vacillation and uncertainty in 
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Leibniz's mind about whether it is necessary or contingent that God chooses 
what is best than about any other main issue in the problem of contingency. 
I shall argue, however, that the view that it is necessary is required by other 
features of Leibniz's philosophy. 
Many passages in which Leibniz appears to  address this issue yield no solid 
evidence on it, in view of some of the subtleties that we have already seen in 
his position. When he says, for example, "God's decisions about contingents 
certainly are not necessary" (Gr 385), the claim can be taken de re with respect 
to the contingents: for any contingent, what God decides about it is not 
necessary (because it takes an infinite analysis to determine what is best). It 
may not be implied, therefore, that it is not necessary that God decides to  
order contingent things as well as possible. Similarly, when Leibniz says that 
"God was infallibly led by His wisdom and goodness. . . t o  giverthe world] the 
best form possible; but He was not led to  it necessarily" (G VI,414 [Remarks 
on King §14]), the expression "to it" (in French "y") does not make clear 
whether the denial of necessity applies d e  re to that form which is the best 
possible for the world, or whether it applies dedicto to God's giving the world 
whatever form is best. We have to  bear in mind Leibniz's saying that "it is a 
necessary proposition" that God wills the best, but He does not will it 
"necessarily," because what is best is not necessarily so (Gr 493f.). 
On the other hand, our present question remains equally unanswered when 
Leibniz says, as he often does, such things as "God cannot fail t o  choose the 
best" (see T Abridgement, VIII). For Leibniz has distinguished several sorts 
of inability and necessity. He may mean only a moral necessity (as he says, 
ibid. [G V1,386]); whereas we are interested in logical or metaphysical 
necessity. 
And when Leibniz says that "God wills the best by His own nature" (Gr 
289), or that the reason for His eternal free action is "the divine nature o r  
perfection itself" (C 405), he says nothing more than is implied by his analytic 
theory of truth. What we want to know is whether God's voluntary optimizing 
is demonstrable-that is, whether it folIows by a finite or only by an infinite 
analysis from the divine nature. In fact, in both the texts I have just quoted on 
this point, it is stated or suggested that it is not demonstrable (Gr 288, C 405). 
First of all, therefore, we must seek texts in which necessity is asserted o r  
denied, de dicto, of some such propositions as "God chooses what is best," 
and in which the necessity is explicitly or contextually indicated as logical or 
metaphysical, or is stated or explained in terms of demonstrability. There are 
several such texts, and they speak on both sides of the question. 
The most explicit texts for the contingency of the crucial propositions date 
from about 1681, when Leibniz was actively engaged in formative work on a 
variety of solutions to the problem of contingency. He had already written, in 
"Necessary and Contingent Truths," that "in a certain way it is of physical 
necessity [which he had distinguished there from metaphysical necessity] that 
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God does all things as well as He can" (C 21/SG 351). But about 1681 he 
denied flatly that the proposition, "that God chooses the best," or "God wills 
to choose the best," can be demonstrated (Gr 301).47 A contrast is introduced 
in a similar denial in another paper from about the same time:48"Thus, that 
God loves Himself is necessary, for it is demonstrable from the definition of 
God. But that God does what is most perfect, cannot be demonstrated, for the 
contrary does not imply a contradiction" (Gr 288). 
The contrast recurs in some later texts. In the early 1690s Leibniz noted 
with approval Thomas Aquinas's opinion "that God's attitude toward 
Himself is necessary and natural, but His attitude toward other things is not 
necessary, nor forced, but voluntary" (Gr 333).49 And in the Theodicy, he 
says, "The love that God has for Himself is essential to Him; but the love of 
His glory, or the will to obtain it, is not essential to Him at all" ( T  233; cf. T 
175, 230). (Here God's glory is conceived as an external attribute, "the 
reflection of the divine perfection in created beings."'O) 
The contingency of "God chooses what is best" seems more favored in the 
Theodicy than in the private papers Leibniz wrote while preparing the book. 
In addition to this passage about God's love of His glory, there is a list of 
things said to be necessary "in a certain sense," but not "logicalIy, geometrically, 
or metaphysically"; among them is "that God Himself chooses the best" 
(T 282; it would not be plausible to read this denial of logical necessity as de re 
with respect to  the best). If the Theodicy were our only source for Leibniz's 
opinions, I think we would find nothing incompatible with the impression that 
Leibniz thinks it contingent, de dicto, that God chooses what is best. And the 
general tenor of the book would leave us with that impression, although most 
passages in it can be interpreted otherwise in the light of his other works. 
Section I3 of the Discourse on Metaphysics gives a similar impression. 
Probably the most important utterance bearing on the issue there is the 
mention of "the first free decision of God, the import of which is to do  always 
that which is most perfect." For if this decision is free and freedom implies 
contingency, it will follow that "God decided to do what is best" is contingent. 
The strongest texts on the other side are those already discussed in section 
2.1 above, in which Leibniz pointedly refrains from denying, and in 1706 
affirms, that "God chooses the best" is logically necessary. Those texts date 
from about 1689 to 1706; but there is an earlier note, from about 1681, in 
which Leibniz says, "From God's essence or supreme perfection it follows, 
certainly and, so to speak, by a necessary implication, that God chooses the 
best" (Gr 297). He  goes on to explain God's freedom in terms of the plurality 
of alternatives possible in their own nature. The phrase "by a necessary 
implication" is important here. When Leibniz wrote in 1698 that "it follows 
from the nature of God that He prefers the most perfect" (Gr 393), he left 
some ambiguity. For he also said that all truths, even contingent ones, follow 
from God, who is the highest truth (Gr 347). Might God's preference for 
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perfection follow from His nature by an infinite rather than a finite analysis, 
and therefore contingently? But what follows from God's essence "by a 
necessary implication" must be necessary-though the qualification "so to 
speak" o r  "if you will" ("si ita loqui placer") still leaves a little uncertainty. 
In reading notes from the 1690s Leibniz held that "the inability to d o  evils 
can be demonstrated in God" (Gr 333) and "rigorously, it can be said that the 
good Angels can sin, and that does not imply a contradiction, but in God it 
does imply one" (Gr 360). Leibniz held more consistently to this thesis than t o  
the more general claim that it is demonstrable that God chooses the best. Even 
in one of the papers from about 1681 in which he states flatly that "God 
chooses the best-is not demonstrable, Leibniz says that damning the innocent 
eternally is not possible for God and is therefore one of those things "whose 
. . . existence implies a contradiction" (Gr 300). 
The only text against this of which I a m  aware is in the Theodicy: "However 
it does not imply a contradiction for God to  will (directly or  permissively) a 
thing that does not imply a contradiction" (T 234). Nothing is said here 
explicitly about whether it is contingent, de  dicto, that God does no evil o r  
that God chooses the best. For the possibility that is asserted is pretty clearly 
de re with respect to  the objects of God's choice: it is claimed about every- 
thing, that if it is possible in itself, considered without regard to  its relation to 
God's will, then it is also possible for God to will to  actualize it. But since 
Leibniz thought the eternal damnation of the innocent is possible in itself 
(Gr 300), it does follow that it is possible for God to damn the innocent 
eternally-which is not far removed from the conclusion that it is possible for 
God to  do evil. 
In general, however, Leibniz seems inclined to the view that it is demon- 
strable that God does no evil, whether or  not it is demonstrable that He  
chooses the best. Indeed, even his 1706 reading note on Bayle in which he says 
that "God wills the work that is most worthy of Him" is a necessary proposi- 
tion ends with a hint that God "cannot d o  or will moral evil" in some sense 
stronger than that in which He cannot fail to  create the best possible world 
(Gr 494). 
But if Leibniz holds that it is demonstrable that God does no evil, how can 
he avoid the conclusion that it is demonstrable that God does not prefer the 
less perfect? "For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, by the same token a lesser 
good is a kind of evil, if it forms an obstacle to  a greater good" (T 8). And in 
maintaining the axiom, "Minus bonum habet rationem mali"("A lesser good 
has the character of a n  evil") (T 194, D M  3, G III,33), Leibniz does not suggest 
that it is contingent. So it seems that preferring the less perfect would neces- 
sarily be doing something evil. 
God is more than sinless. That "God is an absolutely perfect being," morally 
as well as metaphysically, is virtually a definition for Leibniz (DM 1); and so 
far as I know he never suggests that it is contingent. If it is not true by definition, 
LEIBNIZ'S THEORIES OF CONTINGENCY 27 
or at least demonstrable, how is he so  confident that it is true at all? Surely he  
does not know it by experience. And he denies that it is known only by faith 
(T Preliminary Discourse 44). Both Rescher and Curley seem to me to  err in 
saying that Leibniz would solve the problem of contingency by holding that 
God's goodness is contingent.3' 
But that is not the only way in which he could deny that it is necessary that 
God does what is best. For the belief that God does what is best is based on 
two premises: that God is "a most perfect Being," and that "the operation of 
a most perfect Being is most perfect" (Gr 16). And Leibniz did once say that 
the second of these is contingent: "God's choosing a less perfect from among 
many perfect things does not imply an imperfection in God" (Gr 300 [about 
168 11). I agree with this ~ ta tement , '~  but find it astonishingly un-Leibnizian 
and do  not think it fits in his philosophical system. 
One objection to  including it in the system is inconclusive. Leibniz says it is 
morally necessary for God t o  choose the best. And this means that it is neces- 
sary that a perfectly good agent in God's position would choose the best (see 
section 1.5 above). It follows that it is necessary that if God chooses the less 
perfect, He is imperfect (cf. G III,33). But the crucial question here is whether 
this is a logicalnecessity. Is the morally necessary only what it isdemonstrable 
that a perfectly good agent would do? Or  is it enough for moral necessity if 
the action is contained in the concept of a perfectly good agent, even though 
an infinite analysis would be needed to show the reason of the containment? 
The weaker requirement seems to me to  be the one assumed in Leibniz's 
mature writings. For he appears to regard God's choice of this world as 
morally necessary (cf. T Preliminary Discourse 2); but it is not demonstrable 
that a perfectly good agent would choose this world, since it is not demon- 
strable that this world is the best. 
There are other arguments, however, which show that Leibniz cannot 
consistently hold that it is contingent that a supremely perfect being would 
choose the more perfect. For suppose that  is contingent. Then it must either 
be contingent that a supremely perfect being is perfectly good, wise, and just; 
o r  else contingent that a perfectly good, wise, and just being would choose the 
more perfect. Neither of these is contingent for Leibniz. 
For he regards justice as "an essential attribute of God" (Dutens IV,iii,280; 
this is not asserted but contextually implied there). And since God's justice, 
for Leibniz, "depends on wisdom and goodness" (Dutens IV,iii,261; cf. G 
III,34), the latter perfections must presumably be regarded as essential to  
God too. 
Leibniz would also have to admit that it can be demonstrated, from 
acceptable definitions of these perfections, that they imply a preference for 
the best. For he says, 
The end of goodness is the greatest good, but In order to recognize it, wisdom is needed, 
which is nothing other than knowledge of the good, as goodness is nothing other than the 
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lncIlnat~on to  d o  good to  all, and to prevent evil unless it IS necessary for a greatergood or  
to prevent a greater ev1l.53 
Thus Leibniz seems unable to escape the conclusion that it is demonstrable, 
and hence logically necessary, that God, as an  absolutely perfect being, does 
what is best. 
The conflict in Leibniz's thought is reflected in divergent pronouncements 
about "the root of contingency." About 1683 he set out, somewhat tentatively, 
the idea that in dealing with problems of contingency we must "have recourse 
to that one thing which is not essential in God, but free-namely, thedecision 
of the will, from which alone a source of contingency in things can besought" 
(Gr 31 1). This is not unambiguous, but seems t o  agree with Rescher's 
judgment that for Leibniz "the ultimate source of contingent truth is clearly" 
in God's choosing "to act in the most perfect way," rather than in the bestness 
of that which is chosen.54 But elsewhere Leibniz locates the root of contin- 
gency, not in the divine will, but in the objects among which God chooses. 
About 1681 he wrote, "The root of freedom in God is the possibility or 
contingency of thingsw-by which he means the plurality of alternatives 
possible in themselves, as the context shows (Gr 298). About 1695, likewise, 
he wrote notes on the views, ascribed to  Scotus and Aquinas respectively, that 
the root of contingency is in the will of God as free, and that it is in the will of 
God as efficacious. Leibniz commented on the former view that it was 
circular, and on the latter that "contingency is in the nature itself of truth, or 
of the object, as of possibility, as of existence" (Gr 348; cf. Gr 353). Here 
perhaps what he has in mind is that contingent truths cannot be proved by a 
finite analysis. 
The circle with which Leibniz charged Scotus has to do, presumably, with 
seeking the ultimate reason for all contingent facts in a divine decision which 
is itself one of the contingent facts to  be explained. Often Leibniisees an 
infinite regress in place of this circle, and almost always he condemns it as 
vicious. There is one text, however, in which he accepts the infinite regress; 
and this acceptance assumes great importance for the interpretations of 
Rescher and Curley. 
The first principle about Existences is thls proposition: God tcr1l.r t o  choose rhe most 
perfect. This proposition cannot be demonstrated; it is the first of all propositions of fact, 
or  the orlgln of every contingent existence. . . For if anyone asks me why God decided t o  
create Adam, I say because He decided to d o  what is most perfect. Ifyou ask me now why 
He declded to  d o  what 1s most perfect,. . I answer that He willed ~t freely, or  because He 
willed to Therefore He willed because We wllled to will, and s o  on toinfinity. (Gr 301f.) 
Curley says that this text presents "the only one of the various ways in 
which Leibniz invokes infinite processes which seems. . . to have any bearing 
on the problem of contingency."55 Rescher does not cite this passage, but 
proposes, as Leibniz's main solution of the problem of contingency, that 
"God's moral perfection follows from His metaphysical perfection, but the 
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deduction would require a n  infinity of steps."56 Something of this sort is 
required, of course, if the supposed contingency of "God chooses what is 
best" is to be reconciled with Leibniz's analytic theory of truth and infinite 
analysis theory of contingency. 
Rescher's formulation deftly avoids the  obvious objection that the infinite 
regress of reasons violates the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz's use of 
the principle in proving the existence of God requires him to refuse to accept 
an infinite regress of reasons as itself constituting a sufficient reason. Further- 
more Leibniz had said "it is absurd [to suppose] that  a free will is an  ultimate 
reason, since the free will itself has its necessary conditions [requisita], for it 
is not an  independent Being [Ens a se]" (Conf 46 [a marginal comment, 
probably from late 1677 or  early 16781). A sufficient reason must be found in 
something of metaphysical necessity; the  ultimate reason for the existence 
of all things is to be found in the divine essence and intellect. Rescher recog- 
nizes and accepts this. On his interpretation the ultimate sufficient reason is 
found in God's metaphysical perfection; if there is a n  infinite regress of 
volitions, it has a reason outside itself in God's nature. But in conformity with 
the infinite analysis theory of contingency, this reason cannot be proved by a 
finite analysis. 
In the paper in which he accepts the regress, however, Leibniz was not so  
deft as Rescher. For he refused there to  ground the infinite regress of volitions 
in God's essence. "No other reason can be given why God chooses the most 
perfect than because He wills t o  . . . And certainly He wills freely, because 
outside His will no other reason can be given than the will." He goes on to 
claim that "nothing is therefore given without a reason, but that reason is 
intrinsic to the will" (Gr 301). But the infinite regress of volitions he describes 
certainly does not satisfy his principle of sufficient reason. 
It is noteworthy, moreover, that this rather early paper contains no explicit 
appeal to the infinite analysis theory of contingency. I know of no work in 
which Leibniz develops the infinite regress of volitions into the sort of 
solution that Rescher proposes for him. 
For this text, as Grua says (Gr 259), is exceptional. It is the same short paper 
in which Leibniz denied that choosing the less perfect would imply a n  imper- 
fection in God. And the infinite regress of volitions, and the whole idea of 
willing to will, were explicitly rejected by Leibniz, a t  about the same time as 
well as both earlier and later. About 168 1 he wrote, "Indeed God cannot will 
voluntarily; otherwise there would be a will to will [and so  on] to infinity" 
(Grua 289). In the letter to Wedderkopf and in The Philosopher's Confession 
he had denied, with explicit reference to God, that anyone wills what to will 
(A II,i,l I 7 / L  147) or  wills because he wills (Conf 54). In  the New Essays 
Leibniz says, "We d o  not will t o  will, but we will t o  do; and if we willed to will, 
we would will to will t o  wiI1, and that would go to infinity" (NE II,xxi,22-23). 
Here nothing is said explicitly about God. But there is explicit reference to  
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God in the Theodicy where Leibniz says, "It is, in a sense, an abuse of terms 
to say here: one can will, one wills to will; power is related here to the actions 
that one wills" (T 234). 
There are, it must be granted, two texts that support the idea that divine 
decisions, considered as possible, are part of the object of other divine decisions 
(C 24), or more vaguely, that "God executes all reflex acts a t  once and once 
for all" (Gr 345). And indeed Leibniz thought of possible divine decisions as 
involved in the concepts of possible creatures among which God chooses. 
But in these texts it is not stated or suggested that God's general decision to 
do what is best is the object of a prior decision, nor that the regress of decisions 
provides the reason for the decision to act. 
At any rate the infinite regress of volitions is clearly not a keystone of 
Leibniz's position on contingency. On this as well as other grounds that we 
have reviewed, it is fair to say that the view that "God chooses what is best" 
is contingent must not be regarded as a thesis of Leibniz's philosophy, much 
less as a basis of one of his principal solutions to the problem of contingency. 
2.6 An Exception for Existence? 
We are now in a position to deal with the question whether Leibniz meant 
to solve the problem of contingency by making existence an exception to the 
rule that the predicate of a true proposition must be contained in the concept 
of the subject. There are several compelling arguments for a negative answer. 
(1) Leibniz says something that looks very much like an explicit negative 
answer, in the New Essays: 
But when one says that a thing exlsts, o r  that it has real existence, this existence itself is the 
predicate-that is to say, it has a concept linked with the idea that is in question, and there 
is a connection between these two concepts (NE IV,i,3-7).5' 
(2) In many formulations of his analytic theory of truth Leibniz says 
explicitly that the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the 
subject in contingent as well as necessary truths(FC 1791 L263f.; G 11,561 L-A 
63; C 161 SG 346; C 5191 L 267f; C 272; G VI1,199f.; Gr 303). In view of these 
statements, it seems perverse to suppose that Leibniz meant to expIain the 
possibility of contingency by making an exception to the theory for those 
propositions that he regarded as contingent, 
(3) Leibniz made a number of attempts to explain how existence is con- 
tained in the concepts of those things that exist. These attempts typically 
involve some or all of the following claims. The predicate of existence is in 
some way equivalent to  "entering into the most perfect series of things" 
(C 9; cf. Gr  325, B 119f., C 405, C 360,376/P 51, 65f.), or to  pleasing God 
(C 405; cf. C 376/P 65f.). The analysis of concepts would have to be carried to  
infinity, however, to prove the existence of any contingent thing (C 376/P 66; 
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cf. Gr 304f.). The underlying idea, of course, is that existence is contained in 
the concepts of existing things, not directly but by virtue of the factors that 
determine God to create those things. 
(4) As Couturat pointed out, "existential propositions are not the only 
contingent propositions" for Leibniz.58 Couturat chose an unfortunate 
example: laws of nature, which are indeed contingent, but are also existential 
according to Leibniz, as Curley has pointed 0ut.5~ But in sections 2.1 and 2.3 
above we have seen better examples of contingent propositions whose truth, 
according to Leibniz, does not depend on what exists-namely, the proposi- 
tions asserting the bestness of this possible world and the contingent con- 
nections within possible worlds. 
(5) The version of the problem of contingency that troubled Leibniz most 
persistently throughout his life does not depend on his conception of the 
nature of truth, and cannot be solved by making the predicate of existence an 
exception to that conception. For the problem is that the existence of all 
actual things seems to follow, not just from their own concepts, but from the 
concept of God, whose existence Leibniz always regarded as necessary. 
There are some texts, however, that seem to speak on the other side of the 
question. Foremost among them is a passage near the end of the early paper 
"Necessary and Contingent Truths." The paper seems somewhat confused 
on the point that concerns us. For although it contains a statement that the 
concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject even in 
contingent truths (C 16), and an effort to explain how the existences of con- 
tingent things are involved in their concepts, it also contains the statement, 
"For the possibility or Concept of a created mind does not involve existence" 
(C 23). The most favorable interpretation that we can put on this statement 
is that Leibniz is groping after the distinction that he later articulated between 
the complete concept of a thing and its essence (Gr 383). The essence or 
specific concept of any created substance would not contain the existence of 
that substance, although the complete concept would. As was noted in section 
2.3 above, this distinction does not seem to me to serve the purpose of 
rendering propositions contingent in themselves. 
It is a distinction that is needed, however, to  bring into any sort of tolerable 
harmony with the rest of Leibniz's system the fairly numerous texts in which 
he treats "essential" and "existential" as equivalent, respectively, to "necessaryn 
and "contingent." In some of these texts, indeed, he explains "essential" in 
terms of things that "flow from incomplete and specific concepts" (Gr 31 1; 
cf. Gr 383). In other texts he leaves the sense of "essential" unexplained 
(Gr 354, 373); and he never manifests any concern about reconciling his use 
of "existential" with the fact that he holds, and his system implies, that some 
contingent truths do not depend on which finite things actually exist. It is 
difficult to shake off the impression that Leibniz was subject to some persistent 
confusion on this point. 
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3. Leibniz and Possible Worlds Semantics 
It has been discovered that by beginning with the idea that the possible is 
what is true in some possible world and the necessary is what is true in all 
possible worlds, and varying our assumptions about the relations of possible 
worlds t o  each other, we can obtain models that validate different systems 
of modal logic. This discovery has given birth to possible worlds semantics- 
the interpretation of modal notions in terms of truth and falsity in (or at) 
possible worlds. It has shed so much light on modal logic, and has so affected 
our interest in the notion of possible worlds, that it is especially natural for 
us to assume that Leibniz too conceived of necessity as truth in all possible 
worlds and contingency as truth in some but not all possible worlds. But it is 
not at all clear that he did. 
Probably the closest he comes to expressing this conception is in the early 
paper on "Necessary and Contingent Truths," where he says that necessary 
truths, which can be demonstrated by analysis of terms, "not only will obtain 
while the World stands, but also would have obtained if GOD had created the 
World on a different plan" (C 18/SG 348). This is suggestive but not con- 
clusive; for on any reasonable interpretation of Leibniz, he regards no world 
as possible in which something demonstrable is false (if we overlook the 
problem about the damnation of the innocent that was discussed in section 
2.2 above). What we want to  know is whether he thought that all the truths 
that do not depend on which world God created are necessary. He almost says 
that they are. He says that contingent truths, which cannot be demonstrated 
by analysis, "do not express only what pertains to the possibility of things, but 
also what actually exists, or would be going t o  exist if certain conditions were 
satisfied" (C I8/SG 348). In this statement it is not clear whether the 
counterfactual conditional is supposed to rest on causal laws, in which case its 
truth depends on which world is actual, or whether it just means "would exist 
in some possible world." But the initial parts of "Necessary and Contingent 
Truths" seem to me in general to reflect the assumption that contingent 
truths depend on which world is actual. 
On the other hand, Leibniz regarded as contingent some truths which he 
would hardly have regarded as depending on which world God actualized. 
The most obvious example in this category is the proposition that this world 
is the best possible. 
The first step in dealing with this problem is to distinguish two things 
Leibniz may mean by "possible world." He may mean a world whose concept 
is not demonstrably inconsistent, or he may mean a world whose basic 
concept does not involve (demonstrably or otherwise) a contradiction or 
conceptual falsehood. 
The first of these interpretations fits with Leibniz's usual conception of 
necessity in terms of demonstrability, and indeed yields a possible worlds 
semantics for it. Because it is plausible to  suppose that not all conceptual 
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truths are demonstrable, the conceptual truth and demonstrability concep- 
tions of necessity demand different modal logics. The strong system S5 seems 
to be the right modal logic for the conceptual truth conception of necessity.60 
But the characteristic axiom of S5, "-Np 3 N-Np" (if not necessarilyp, then 
necessarily not necessarily p), is not valid on the demonstrability conception 
of necessity. For a proposition may be indemonstrable without being 
demonstrably indemonstrable. (In rejecting this axiom, it should be noted, 
one rejects the assumption that all truths about the possible as such are 
necessary.) The weaker system S4 seems to be the right system for the 
demonstrability conception of necessity. Its characteristic axiom, "Np 3 NNp" 
(if necessarily p ,  then necessarily necessarily p), will be valid under that 
conception; for what can be demonstrated can thereby be demonstrated to be 
demonstrable. 
By the same token, if we assume that a world w2 is possible in a world wl if 
and only if nothing is true in w2 whose falsity can be demonstrated in wl,  we 
obtain the result that the relation among possible worlds expressed by 
"possible in" is reflexive and transitive but not symmetrical. It is reflexive, 
if we restrict consideration to worlds that are possible (that is, possible in the 
actual world); for Leibniz will surely hold that "Something is true which is 
demonstrably false" is (in the actual world) demonstrably false, but it must 
be true in any world that is not possible in itself. The transitivity of the 
"possible in" relation is proved as follows. Suppose there is a world w2 which 
is possible in world W I ,  and a world w3 which is possible in wz but not in w,. 
There must be some propositionp which is true in w3 but whosefalsity can be 
demonstrated in WI,  though not in w2. But then there is a proposition (thatp is 
not demonstrably false) which is true in wz but demonstrably false in wl; its 
falsity is demonstrated in WI by demonstrating the falsity ofp.  So  w2 is not 
possible in W I ,  contrary to the hypothesis; and the "possibIe in" relation must 
be transitive after all. It is not symmetrical, however. For there is, as Leibniz 
supposes, at least one proposition p which is possible, and actually true, but 
not demonstrably possible. A world in which it is true that p is demonstrably 
false will therefore be possible in the actual world, but the actual world will 
not be possible in such a world. 
It is known that a "possible in" relation that is reflexive and transitive but 
not symmetrical is the principal feature that a system of possible worlds 
should have if it is to provide a semantics for S4 but not for ~ 5 . ~ '  Thus the 
possible worlds semantics based on the demonstrability conception of 
possible worlds seems to fit the modal logic suggested by the demonstrability 
conception of necessity. 
But does Leibniz hold this conception of possible worlds? Certainly he does 
not work out an S4 semantics; he does not even raise the question of a "possible 
in" relation among possible worlds. The crucial question is whether he 
34 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
understands "possible" in "possible world" in terms of demonstrability and 
indemonstrability. 
He says something that implies that he does: 
There areas many possible worlds as there are series ofthings that can be thought up which 
d o  not imply a contradiction. This thesis is identical with me, for I call possible that which 
does not imply a contradiction, and so in this sense it cannot be refuted. (Gr 390 [March, 
16981) 
I assume that "does not imply a contradiction" expresses a proof-theoretical 
notion here, as it usually does in Leibniz. On this interpretation Leibniz here 
lets a consistent, univocal use of modal terms carry the proof-theoretical or 
demonstrability conception of possibility into his conception of possible 
worlds. 
On the other hand, the demonstrability conception of possible worlds has 
some strikingly un-Leibnizian consequences. (1) A possible individual will in 
general exist in more than one possible world. Leibniz holds that many of the 
properties contained in an individual's complete concept cannot be demon- 
strated from the concept. Worlds in which the individual lacks various of 
those properties will therefore not be demonstrably inconsistent. (2) Each 
actual individual will be compossible with individuals of almost every 
possible sort, in the sense of coexisting in some possible world with an 
individual of that sort. For the coexistence of a certain actual individual with 
any possible sort of individual will rarely if ever be demonstrably inconsistent. 
(3) There will be possible worlds in which different worlds will be the best 
possible; for the bestness of this world is not demonstrable. (4) There will be 
possible worlds that have (with one exception) all the perfections that the 
actual world (considered as possible) has, and more. There will be, for 
example, a world as good as the actual world in other respects, from which the 
horrors of the Thirty Years War are absent. Leibniz surely did not think it 
could be demonstrated that the world would be less perfect without the 
Thirty Years War. The exception, the perfection that the actual world has but 
those worlds lack, is conceptual consistency, as we may call the property of 
not involving, not even indemonstrably, a contradiction. 
Leibniz never accepts these consequences. Indeed he explicitly rejects the 
idea of an individualexisting in more than one possible world (DM 30, T414). 
And for certain crucial purposes in his theory of creation he needs modalities 
quite different from those that are generated by the demonstrability concep- 
tion of necessity. His explanation of why God did not create Judas (precisely 
and individually Judas) without his treason is that even God couldn't do that. 
Similarly he must claim that God couldn't have created a world as good as 
the actual world in other respects but lacking the horrors of the Thirty Years 
War. These "couldn't"~ cannot be explained in terms of demonstrability. And 
Leibniz certainly does not mean that God was prevented by His goodness 
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from choosing these worlds, having judged that Judas's treason and the 
horrors of the Thirty Years War are better than conceptual inconsistency. 
Rather it is not within God's power to  create such worlds, because they are 
not possible in their own nature. 
The claim that two possible substances are compossible, likewise, is surely 
not just the claim that they are not demonstrably incompatible, in spite of 
that fact that Leibniz defined "compossible" as "that which with another does 
not imply a contradiction" (Gr 325). For  it is lack of compossibility that keeps 
additional excellent substances from existing in the actual world (G III,572f., 
C 534). But the addition of such substances is surely not demonstrably 
inconsistent with the concepts of actual things. 
One may be tempted to  accuse Leibniz of cheating in his theodicy by using 
modal terms equivocally. There is a sense in which God couldn't have created 
a better world than He did (it is conceptually false that there is sucha world). 
But in that sense He also couldn't have done anything different at all (it is 
conceptually false that He does anything different). There is also a sense in 
which He could have done something different (it is not demonstrable that 
He does not, say, omit to  create giraffes). But in that sense He could also have 
made something better than this world (it is not demonstrable that no possible 
alternative is better). 
There is yet another sense of "could" and "couldn't" available to  Leibniz, 
however, in which he can say, without equivocation, both of the things he  
wants to  say. God could have done something different, in the sense that only 
His goodness keeps Him from doing so. But He couldn't have created a better 
world than this, in the sense that it is not only His goodness that keeps a better 
alternative from being possible. We could systematize these modalities 
(although Leibniz did not) by using "It is possible that p" t o  mean roughly 
that if it were not a conceptual truth that God is perfectly good, it would not 
be a conceptual falsehood that p.62 
Leibniz's chief use of the imagery of possible worlds is at those points in his 
theory of creation that require this last sort of modality. "There are several 
possible Universes, each collection of compossibles making one of them" 
(G 111,573). The possible worlds are the alternatives among which God 
chooses, and among which only His goodness keeps Him from choosing 
otherwise than He does. There must not be among them a world in which 
Judas exists but is not a traitor, or which is as good in other ways as the actuaI 
world but lacks the horrors of the Thirty Years War. The conception of a 
possible world that is implied by this use of the imagery, and which must 
therefore be reckoned Leibniz's principal conception, is not that of a world 
that is not demonstrably inconsistent. I t  is rather that of a world whose basic 
concept does not involve (demonstrably or otherwise) a contradiction or  
conceptual falsehood, a world whose basic concept is conceptually c o n ~ i s t e n t . ~ ~  
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If we admit to  the basic concepts of worlds information about everything 
except God's goodness and His choice among worlds (see section 1,2 above), 
this conception of possible worlds probably yields a satisfactory semantics 
for "It is possible that p" interpreted as meaning that if it were not a concep- 
tual truth that God is perfectly good, it would not be a conceptual falsehood 
that p. But although it would be helpful in explaining his theory of creation, 
Leibniz does not really develop this interpretation, and does not usually use 
"it is possible that" in this sense. His main conception of possibility is the 
proof-theoretical one that can be analyzed in terms of indemonstrability of 
falsehood. Thus Leibniz's main conception of possible worlds does not provide 
a possible worlds semantics for his main conception of possibility. If we put 
the two main conceptions together, we get the result that there are propositions 
which are possible but are not true in any possible world. "Judas exists 
without betraying Jesus" is such a proposition. 
I d o  not mean t o  suggest that Leibniz was fully aware of the diversity of 
sorts of modality at work in his philosophy. Had he been conscious of it he 
would presumably have articulated the relevant distinctions more clearly, 
and avoided some apparent inconsistencies. He might also have explored 
the relations between the different sorts of modality and the notion of a 
possible world. But he did not, and it is quite misleading to think of him as 
a grandfather of possible worlds semantics, given the bad fit between his 
principal conception of possible worlds and his principal modal concepts. 
4. Epilogue: On Leibniz's Sincerity 
On no point has more suspicion of a cleavage between a public and a 
private Leibnizian philosophy arisen than on the problem of contingency. 
Leibniz's sincerity in the Theodicy has often been impugned, and often 
defended. It is partly but not entirely vindicated by the results of the present 
investigation. 
It is emphatically clear in the Theodicy, as in the rest of his work, that 
Leibniz is a compatibilist and a determinist. The solution of the problem of 
contingency that is most clearly developed in the Theodicy, that non-actual 
things are possible in themselves even if they are not possible in relation to  
God's will, is one that Leibniz also held, and never abandoned, in his private 
papers from 1673 on. It is a solution that imposes a minimum of qualification 
on the necessity of all things. 
The infinite analysis theory of contingency is partly stated in the Theodicy, 
in 414 of the Remarks on King: 
For one may say in a way that these two principles [ofcontradictionand sufficient reason] 
are contained in the definition of True and False. Nevertheless, when in making the 
analysis of the truth that has been proposed one sees it dependingon truths whose contrary 
implies a contradiction, one may say that it is absolutely necessary. But when in pushing 
the analysis as far as one pleases one is never able to arrive at  such elements of given truth, 
one must say that it is contingent. (G VI,414) 
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Here, as in a letter to Louis Bourguet in 1715 (G III,582), Leibniz says that 
necessary truths receive a finite analysis and contingent truths do not, but 
without stating that this is what contingency consists in, or that the concept 
of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject even in contingent 
truths. 
We have seen that the view that "God chooses what is best" is contingent, 
about which Leibniz was very hesitant in his private papers, seems to  occur 
in one or two passages of the Theodicy. This might be due to some develop- 
ment in his thought, but no such explanation is plausible for the Theodicy's 
striking omission of any mention of the view that it is contingent that this 
world is the best. The latter view was well worked out, affirmed, and never 
rejected in Leibniz's private papers; and it is plausibly inferred from his 
infinite analysis theory of contingency, which he clearly continued to believe 
when he wrote the Theodicy. 
Moreover, the frequent and unelucidated use that the book makes of the 
terms "moral necessity," "hypothetical necessity," and "incline without 
necessitating" leaves the reader with a Iess necessitarian impression of 
Leibniz's thought than these terms would leave if they were accompanied by 
the explanations of their meaning that are presented or suggested by his less 
public writings. One is not reassured about Leibniz's sincerity when one 
reads, in a letter from Leibniz to  Des Bosses discussing the use of "moral 
necessity" in the Theodicy, the comment, "And in general I should prefer the 
words to be interpreted in such a way that nothing bad-sounding follows" 
(G 11,419). 
The lack of candor in the Theodicy is evident; the motives for it, whether 
pedagogical or self-protective, are not. I t  is interesting that Leibniz had 
written once, probably during the years 1675-1677, 
Metaphysics should be written with accurate definitions and demonstrations, but nothing 
should be demonstrated in it that conflicts too much with received opinions. Thus this 
metaphysics will be able to  be received. if it is once approved, then afterwards, if any 
examine it more profoundly, they will deduce that the consequences are necessary.M 
One of the difficulties in the Theodicy, however, is that so many of Leibniz's 
"accurate definitions" are omitted that one must turn to other works to  find 
the material necessary for a profounder examination.65 
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